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Abstract
Numerous experiments pertaining to quantum nonlocality are un-
derway or have recently been completed. A certain theoretical defect
in the linkage between these experiments and nonlocality is discussed.
This defect consists of the use of a reality concept that conflicts with
the quantum precepts. This concept could be a hidden-variable as-
sumption, or an Einstein reality assumption. A proof that avoids
these difficulties has been given recently. It demonstrates the incom-
patibility of the predictions of quantum theory with a certain local-
ity requirement. This proof is based directly on logical arguments
involving counterfactual statements, but has been criticized because
it is based on orthodox logical principles, which might possibly be
tainted with some classical idea. A rigorous framework for reasoning
with counterfactual statements within the structure defined by the
quantum precepts is constructed here, and the earlier proof is car-
ried through in this strictly quantum framework. Griffiths has pro-
posed another framework for consistent reasoning with counterfactuals
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76SF00098.
within quantum theory, and the proof goes through also within the
Griffiths framework. The proof involves a Hardy-type of experimental
set up, and, thus, according to the present analysis, it is experiments
of this kind that should be performed to validate the empirical basis
of any claimed quantum nonlocality.
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1. Introduction.
There is considerable experimental activity on the issue of quantum non-
locality. A recent issue Physics Today[1] has a bulletin entitled “Nonlocality
Get More Real” that reports experiments at three laboratories (Geneva, Inns-
bruck, and Los Alamos) directed at closing loopholes in proofs purporting
to show that “seemingly instantaneous” influences can act over large dis-
tances. The first of these papers [2], where the measured effect extends over
a distance of more than 10km, begins with the words “Quantum theory is
nonlocal.” The longer version [3] says “Today, most physicists are convinced
that a future loophole-free test will definitely demonstrate that nature is
indeed nonlocal.”
The question thus arises: Is there evidence for a breakdown of the ortho-
dox basic locality property of quantum theory?
The answer is “No”.
But then what are these laboratories and physicists doing?
The answer is this: They are considering a locality property that is re-
lated to the orthodox one, but not identical to it. But what motivates this
deviation from orthodoxy?
To understand the motivation one should recall first the orthodox locality
property. It follows directly from basic principles of quantum theory. These
basic principles are:
1. The Reduction Formula:
S −→ [PSP + (1− P )S(1− P )]
−→ [PSP or (1− P )S(1− P )].
2. The Probability Formula:
< P >= Trace PS/ Trace S.
3. The Microcausality Condition:
[Q1(x1), Q2(x2)] = 0 for (x1 − x2)
2 < 0.
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The first line of the first formula specifies the reduction of the state S
associated with the answering (by nature) of the question associated with the
projection operator with P , provided that answer is not known: the second
line describes the reduction when the answer is known.
The second formula is the prediction of quantum theory for the average
value of the function that has value unity or zero according to whether the
answer to the question associated with the projection operator P is ‘Yes’ or
‘No’, respectively.
The third line asserts that the operators associated with observables mea-
sured in two space-like-separated regions commute.
If two projection operators P1 and P2 correspond to observables measured
in two spacelike-separated regions then these principles entail (using the nor-
malization Trace S = 1 and the defining property of projection operators,
P 2 = P )
< P1 >
′= Trace P1[P2SP2 + (1− P2)S(1− P2)]
= Trace P1[SP2P2 + S(1− P2)(1− P2)]
= Trace P1[SP2 + S(1− P2)]
= Trace P1S
= < P1 >.
This gives the orthodox locality property:
“The fraction of answers ‘Yes’ predicted by quantum theory for the outcome
of a measurement performed in one spacetime region is independent of which
experiment, if any, is performed in a spacetime region that is space-like-
separated from the first region.”
Each prediction of quantum theory is fundamentally a prediction of the
observed average value of a function that is either unity or zero depending
on whether some particular outcome appears or not. But the fact that such
an average value does not depend upon which experiment is performed in a
far-away region does not entail that the individual outcomes do not depend
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upon which experiment is performed faraway: the individual outcomes in one
region could be highly dependent upon which experiment is performed far
away without violating any principle of quantum theory. Yet in spite of the
silence of quantum theory on this matter, it would nevertheless seem that
a dependence of the observed outcome in one region upon which free choice
is made faraway at the same time would violate in some way the idea that
there is no faster-than-light influence of any kind.
What will be proved here is this: The predictions of quantum theory
are incompatible with the demand that no effect of any kind can be located
outside the forward lightcone of its cause. This condition will be formulated
below as two precisely defined conditions, LOC1 and LOC2.
According to orthodox quantum thinking, experimenters are deemed free
to choose which experiment they will perform. Indeed, Bohr’s idea of com-
plementarity is that, for any single experiment that an experimenter might
choose to perform, the quantum state of a system gives statistical information
pertaining to the outcomes that will appear to him if he chooses to perform
that particular experiment.
This idea, that the choices made by the experimenters can be treated as
free variables, underlies the idea of locality described above: it allows these
choices to be identified as effective primitive causes, within the context of
the study of the system upon which the experiments are performed.
The three papers [2, 4, 5] cited in [1] do not actually examine any locality
property itself. They explore something else, namely whether certain “Bell
Inequalities” hold. John Bell [6], in a response to the paper of Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen [7] introduced a ‘reality’ concept. He assumed, in con-
nection with certain two-particle correlation experiments, the existence of a
“hidden variable” substructure, and then imposed on this substructure a lo-
cality condition. He showed that the resulting local hidden-variable structure
is incompatible with the assumed validity of certain predictions of quantum
theory. However, the local hidden-variable structure that he assumed entails
[8,9] the existence of a model in which the outcomes of all of the possible
experiments that might be performed on the two particles are simultaneously
well defined. Thus this assumed property directly violates a basic precept of
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quantum thinking.
Bell’s objective was to show that the existence of an underlying reality of
the sort that Einstein was searching for is incompatible with the predictions
of quantum theory. Bell’s success constitutes strong support for the orthodox
quantum position that no underlying reality compatible with the precepts of
classical physics can be compatible with the predictions of quantum the-
ory. But since conclusions of this Bell-type depend upon assuming a hidden
variables substructure (or making an associated “Einstein Reality Assump-
tion”) they do not entail that locality itself fails. For the hidden-variable (or
Einstein Reality) assumption could be the source of the contradiction.
The basic problem that must be solved if one is to examine the locality
issue itself is this: How can one introduce a condition that implements the
locality notion — that earlier effects cannot depend upon a later free choice
between mutually exclusive experimental arrangements — without introduc-
ing some structure that already violates the quantum precepts.
The contradiction at issue here is between a locality condition and cer-
tain predictions of quantum theory. All of the relevant conditions can be
formulated as logical statements. Hence the most direct approach would be
to deduce rigorously a logical contradiction from the principles of logic alone,
thereby avoiding any dependence of the conclusion upon other assumptions.
Logicians have developed methods for reasoning consistently with state-
ments of the relevant kind. Those methods provide a potent logical frame-
work in which the arguments can be pursued. However, those orthodox
principles of reasoning were developed in a context in which the notions of
classical mechanics were tacitly presumed to be valid. So the question arises
as to whether use of orthodox logic would already prejudice the argument.
It turns out that the orthodox principles work even better in the quantum
context than in the classical one. This is because in the classical case the
idea of a free choice between alternative possibilities already conflicts with
the deterministic laws of physics that constitute the foundation of the claim
that some statement “would be true” if some choice had gone the other way.
Moreover, in the classical context it was necessary to introduce an imprecise
idea of “closeness of worlds” that takes one outside what is strictly deducible
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from the laws and principles of physics alone. In the present case the con-
clusion must be rigorous consequences of nothing but (1), the predictions of
quantum theory; (2), a precisely formulated principle that expresses nothing
but the locality concept in question; and (3), the rudimentary principles of
logic. Any reliance on some vaguely defined concept of closeness is unaccept-
able.
In an earlier description [10] of the logical argument in question I stressed
concordance with orthodox logic developed by logicians. However, that ap-
proach incurred a liability as regards communication with physicists. Most
physicists are not versed in these logical developments, and lack the time to
become so. Hence the contradiction could be imagined to be due to some
spurious effect of an obscure logical framework. Adherence to the orthodox
principles was thus transformed from a virtue to a defect.
To avoid these problems I shall give here an internally complete account
based exclusively on the precepts of quantum physics and rudimentary logic.
The question arises as to whether this issue is pertinent to physics. One
view would be that we have, in quantum theory, an excellent theory that
appears to work perfectly, and that we should therefore rigorously abstain
from thinking about questions that lead beyond the computational rules
themselves: physicists should follow the adage “Don’t think, just calculate!”
That is a good recipe for developing in more detail what we already have.
Yet physics is not engineering. The question of how the world can possibly
be like what quantum theory shows it to be is not necessarily eternally unan-
swerable. Bell himself argued that we physicists ought to try to do better
than just settle for puzzling rules about what will appear under specified con-
ditions. Certainly the large efforts that experimentalist are putting into these
probes into “local realism” and “nonlocality” show that many physicists are
interested in delving into the odd behaviour of nature that is so wonderfully
codified in the rules of quantum theory. Understanding the locality issue is
one place where progress may be possible.
This matter has been discussed twice before in this journal.
Unruh [11] has challenged my claim that the method I employ avoids
any violation of the quantum precepts. His claims are based, I believe, on
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a misapprehension of the structure of my argument. Indeed, he proposed a
wide assortment of conceivable interpretations of statements my in proof, and
complained that I did not explain my approach in enough detail. So my first
aim here is to describe the method in more detail than before, completely
within the framework provided by quantum precepts.
Griffiths [12] has proposed a quantum theoretical framework for consis-
tent counterfactual reasoning based on his idea of “consistent histories”. He
applied his framework in one special way to one particular nonlocality argu-
ment, of his own making, and found that this argument did not go through,
and concluded, more generally, that there was no evidence within his frame-
work for any nonlocal influences. However, Griffiths’ framework for consis-
tent counterfactual reasoning within quantum theory can be applied directly
to the first part of my nonlocality argument, and it then validates straight-
forwardly, within that framework, this first part of my argument. Applied
next to the rest of my argument his framework validates the further claim
that imposition of the second locality condition, LOC2, generates a contra-
diction. Thus Griffiths’ framework for consistent counterfactual reasoning
within quantum theory reaffirms the validity of the conclusion deduced here.
2. Formulation of the First Locality Condition.
The first locality condition expresses the locality/causality idea that if an
experiment is performed and the outcome is recorded prior to some time T ,
as measured in some Lorentz frame, then this outcome can be regarded as
fixed and settled, independently of which experiment may be freely chosen
and performed (faraway) at a time later than T .
This putative condition is a theoretical idea, and it depends on another
theoretical idea, namely the notion that experimenters can be considered free
to choose between the alternative possible experiments that are available to
them. Bohr himself often stressed that the choices made by experimenters
should be considered free: the whole idea of complementarity is that the
single quantum state represents, simultaneously, the pertinent information
concerning all of these alternative possibilities. In his debate with Einstein
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he never tried to duck the issues by claiming that one simply could not even
contemplate or discuss these alternative possibilities, only one of which could
actually be realized. By simply refusing even to contemplate the alternative
possible experimental choices Bohr could have protected quantum theory
from challenges pertaining to possible nonlocal influences, but only at the
expense of a closed mindedness that he did not embrace.
It turns out that one can, in fact, accommodate, without any apparent
contradiction, the theoretical notion that recorded outcomes are independent
of what experimenters decide to do later. This can be achieved by bringing
counterfactual notions into quantum theory in a certain prescribed way.
The basic notion underlying a clean and rigorous approach to counterfac-
tuals within quantum theory is the concept of “possible worlds”. Suppose
one is considering a specified set of alternative possible experimental arrange-
ments generated by the free choices made by a set of experimenters. Each
of the alternative possible experimental arrangements is assumed to be spec-
ified by a set of local macroscopic conditions — one for each experimenter
— localized in a corresponding spacetime region. And each of the possible
outcomes of such an extended (global) experiment is supposed to be specified
by a set of local macroscopic conditions, one located in each of the experi-
mental regions. If there were NE experimenters in NE different regions, and
each experimenter could choose between NM local measurements, and each
of these measurements could have NO possible outcomes, then the total num-
ber of logically possible worlds under consideration is (NM ×NO)
NE . Each of
the finite set of elementary statements that enter into the characterization
of these various worlds is associated with a macroscopic spacetime region,
and with one bit of information that is associated with some possible macro-
scopic event in that region. The physically possible worlds are a subset of the
logically possible worlds: the physically possible worlds include only those
that, according to the predictions of quantum theory, have a non-null proba-
bility to appear. The physically possible worlds are called “possible worlds.”
Normally, I omit also the word “possible”: unless otherwise stated a “world”
will mean a “physically possible world”.
The rudimentary logical relationships involve the terms “and”, “or”,
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“equal” and “negation”. A statement S involving these relations is said
to be true at (or in) world W if and only if S is true by virtue of the set of
truths that define W.
One further rudimentary relationship is the so-called “material condi-
tional”, which is represented here by the single arrow →: the statement
“A→ B is true at world W” is equivalent to [‘A is false at W ’ or ‘B is true
at W ’ ].
This rudimentary relationship is different from the logical relationship
called the “strict conditional”, which is represented here by the word “im-
plies”. The statement “ ‘A is true’ implies ‘B is true’ ” is sometimes shortened
to “A implies B”, and is represented symbolically here by A ⇒ B. By def-
inition, A ⇒ B is true if and only if for every (physically possible) world
W either “B is true at W” or “A is false at W”: i.e., for every (physically
possible) world W, the rudimentary statement A→ B is true at W.
The logical structure being used here can be expressed in terms of sets:
Let {W : X} represent the set of worlds W such that the rudimentary
statement X is true at W . The symbol {X} is an abbreviation of {W : X}.
Thus the statement that A ⇒ B is true is equivalent to the statement that
{A} ⊂ {B}: [‘The set of W at which A is true’ is a subset of the set of W
at which B is true.] It is also equivalent to the statement: {A} ∩ {¬B} = ∅:
[The intersection of the set of W at which A is true with the set of W at
which B is false is the empty set.]
It follows from these definitions (see Appendix) that
[A⇒ (B → C)] ≡ [(A ∧ B)⇒ C], (2.1)
where the symbol ∧ stands for “and” (conjunction): Each side of (2.1) is
true if and only if {A} ∩ {B} ∩ {¬C} = ∅.
Consider, then, the statement
A⇒ (B → C). (2.2)
But suppose A is the negation of B: A = ¬B. Then the statement (2.2) is,
by virtue of the identity (2.1), and the falseness of “¬B ∧ B”, true for any
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C: the statement (2.2) would be true, but could have no empirical content.
The same lack of content would obtain if A = (¬B ∧D).
Consider, then, the following analogous statement:
“If experiment R2 is performed in region R and experiment L2 is performed
in (the spacelike separated) region L and outcome L2+ appears in L, then if
R1 is performed in R the outcome in L would be L2+.”
Suppose R1 and R2 are mutually exclusive experiments [i.e., “R2 is per-
formed” implies that it is false that “R1 is performed”, and vice versa].
Then the above statement is trivially true for any value of the final symbol
L2+. Consequently, this statement cannot be a valid expression of any lo-
cality property.
The correct statement of the locality condition employs a different sort
implication, one that uses the word and concept “instead”. This concept is
of central importance in orthodox counterfactual reasoning, and I shall here
give it a precise and appropriate meaning within a strictly quantum context.
Consider a statement of the form:
LOC1: “A implies that if, instead, C then D,” (LOC1a)
where C might be incompatible with A. The premise of the final conclusion
D is that C holds instead of A, not in addition to A. This avoids the intrinsic
contradiction that arose before. However, the exact meaning of statements
of this form must be specified.
The key statement “If, instead, C then D” is traditionally represented
symbolically by [C✷ → D]. I shall use that symbolic form for the quantum
version defined here. It is a statement that is made in one world, say W ,
about some other worlds W ′. I shall use it to give precise meaning to the
locality idea that no influence can have an effect outside the forward light
cone of its cause. However, the definition will entail all of the properties
of these “instead” statements that arise in my proof, and that in the proof
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of ref. [10] were justified by appeal to orthodox logic. The condition C
in such a statement will always be a condition that is controlled by a free
choice: it will be an assertion that, in some one of the specified experimental
spacetime regions, some one of the specified alternative possible mutually
exclusive experiments associated with that region is chosen and performed.
The assertion [C✷→ D] is, by definition, true in world W if and only if
D is true in every world W ′ that is the same as W apart from effects that
could be due to imposing condition C. All effects are permitted except those
that violate the locality condition or the predictions of quantum theory. This
locality condition specifies, precisely, that all effects of imposing condition C
on the worldW are confined to the forward lightcone V +(C/W ) of the region
in which C conflicts with W .
Thus [C✷ → D] is, by definition, true in W if and only if D is true in
every (physically possible) world W ′ such that;
(1) C is true in W ′, and (2.5a)
(2) W ′ coincides with W outside V +(C/W ). (2.5b)
The statement [A⇒ (C✷→ D)] is, by definition, true if and only if the
set of possible worlds in which A is true is contained in the set of possible
worlds in which [C✷→ D] is true: implication retains its usual meaning.
The statement
LOC1: A ⇒ [C ✷→ D] (LOC1b)
captures exactly the locality idea that if A is true in a possible world W
then D must be true in every possible world W ′ that differs from W only
by possible effects of imposing condition C. The only limitation in these
possible effects is that they are, by virtue of our locality condition, confined
to the forward light-cone V +(C/W ).
An important special case is
(L2 ∧ R2 ∧ L2+)⇒ [R1✷→ L2 ∧ R1 ∧ L2+]. (LOC1c)
This asserts that what is true in L, namely that the outcome + that (in
some Lorentz frame) has already appeared, cannot be disturbed by a change
in what will be freely chosen and performed at some later time.
The definition of LOC1 entails the following property: If condition B is
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located outside V +(C), hence outside V +(C/W ) for all W , then
[(A ∧ B)⇒ (C✷→ D)] ≡ [A⇒ (C✷→ (B → D))]. (LOC1d)
This follows from the fact that on the LHS of (LOC1d) the condition B is
imposed on W , hence, by virtue of condition (2.5b), on W ′, whereas on the
RHS of (LOC1d) this condition B is imposed on W ′, hence, by virtue of
condition (2.5b), on W .
A similar argument gives, under the same condition on B,
[(A ∧ B)⇒ (C✷→ B ∧D)] ≡ [(A ∧B)⇒ (C✷→ D)]. (LOC1e)
It also follows from the definition of LOC1, under this same condition on B.
that
[B ⇒ (C → D)]⇒ [B ⇒ (C✷→ D)]. (LOC1f)
Proofs of these properties are given in the appendix.
3. Proof of the incompatibility of locality with the predictions of
quantum theory.
The argument is based on a Hardy-type [13] experimental set-up. This
set-up defines the universe of statements under consideration here.
There are two experimental regions R and L, which are spacelike sepa-
rated. In region R there are two alternative possible measurements, R1 and
R2. In region L there are two alternative possible measurements, L1 and
L2. Each local experiment has two alternative possible outcomes, labelled
by + and –. The symbol R1 appearing in a logical statement stands for
the statement “Experiment R1 is chosen and performed in region R.” The
symbol R1+ stands for the statement that “The outcome ‘+’ of experiment
R1 appears in region R.” Analogous statements with other variables have the
analogous meanings.
There are, in the Hardy-type experimental set up, four pertinent predic-
tions of quantum theory. They are expressed by the four logical statements:
(L2 ∧ R2 ∧ R2+)⇒ (L2 ∧ R2 ∧ L2+). (3.1)
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(L2 ∧R1 ∧ L2+)⇒ (L2 ∧R1 ∧ R1−). (3.2)
(L1 ∧R2 ∧ L1−)⇒ (L1 ∧ R2 ∧ R2+). (3.3)
¬[(L1 ∧ R1 ∧ L1−)⇒ (R1−)]. (3.4)
The symbol ¬ in front of the square brackets in (3.4) means that the state-
ment in the square brackets is false.
The detectors are assumed to be 100% efficienct, so that for each possible
world some outcome, either + or −, will, according to quantum mechanics,
appear in each of the two regions: for each (Ri, Lj), with i and j either 1
or 2, each world W in {Ri} ∩ {Lj} lies somewhere in {Ri+} ∪ {Ri−} and
somewhere in {Lj+} ∪ {Lj−} (3.5)
Each line of the following proof is a strict consequence of these predic-
tions of quantum mechanics, combined with the definition of LOC1 and the
properties of the rudimentary logical symbols, plus the assumption LOC2,
which is the assertion that line 6 of the proof follows from line 5 by virtue of
the demand that no influence can act backward in time in any frame. LOC2
is discussed in the next section.
Proof:
1. (L2 ∧R2 ∧ L2+)⇒ [R1✷→ (L2 ∧ R1 ∧ L2+)]. [LOC1c]
2. (L2 ∧R2 ∧ R2+)⇒ (L2 ∧R2 ∧ L2+). [3.1]
3. (L2 ∧R1 ∧ L2+)⇒ (L2 ∧ R1 ∧ R1−)]. [3.2]
4. (L2 ∧R2 ∧ R2+)⇒ [R1✷→ (L2 ∧ R1 ∧R1−)]. [From 1, 2, and 3]
5. L2⇒ [(R2 ∧R2+)→ (R1✷→ R1 ∧ R1−)]. [LOC1e, (2.1)]
6. L1⇒ [(R2 ∧R2+)→ (R1✷→ R1 ∧ R1−)]. [LOC2]
7. (L1 ∧R2)⇒ [R2+→ (R1✷→ R1 ∧ R1−)]. [LOGIC]
8. (L1 ∧R2)⇒ [L1− → R2+]. [3.3]
9. (L1 ∧R2)⇒ [L1− → (R1✷→ R1 ∧R1−)]. [From 7 and 8.]
10. (L1 ∧ R2 ∧ L1−)⇒ (R1✷→ R1 ∧ R1−) (2.1)
11. (L1 ∧ R2)⇒ [R1✷→ (L1− → R1 ∧R1−)]. [LOC1d]
12. L1⇒ [R1→ ¬(L1− → R1 ∧ R1−)]. [3.4]
13. L1⇒ [R1✷→ ¬(L1− → R1 ∧R1−)]. [(LOC1f)]
14. (L1 ∧ R2)⇒ [R1✷→ ¬[L1− → (R1 ∧ R1−)]]. [LOGIC.]
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But the conjunction of 11 and 14 contradicts the assumption that the
experimenters in regions R and L are free to choose which experiments they
will perform. (See Appendix for details.) Thus the incompatibility of the
assumptions of the proof is established.
[Note that there is only one strict conditional [⇒] in each line. In reference
10, some material conditionals standing to the right of this strict conditional
were mistakenly represented by the double arrow ⇒, rather than by →. I
thank Abner Shimomy and Howard Stein [19] for alerting me this notational
error.]
4. The condition LOC 2.
According to the most strict construal of the Copenhagen interpretation,
the quantum formalism is merely a set of rules for making predictions per-
taining to the appearance to human observers, under specified conditions, of
events meeting certain specifications. Nevertheless, the normal idea among
quantum physicists is that certain real events actually occur in association
with measuring devices that are actually set in place. Dirac[14] speaks of
“a choice on the part of ‘nature’ ”, and Heisenberg[15] says that “we may
say that the transition from ‘possible’ to ‘actual’ takes place as soon as the
interaction of the object with the measuring device, and thereby with the
rest of the world, has come into play.” But there is a strong emphasis on the
stipulation that these ‘choices on the part of nature’ or ‘transitions from the
possible to the actual’ occur only if the measuring device is actually in place:
one cannot assume that what ‘would have happened’ in some experiment is
well defined, even theoretically, unless that experiment is actually performed.
Although the quantum precepts unequivocally reject any assumption or
presumption that, for an unperformed measurement, “what would appear”
can be theoretically defined, these precepts do not absolutely rule out this
possibility in every conceivable situation. Indeed, the basic intent here is to
try to retain at least the notion that the outcome of a measurement that
“has already been completed” can be assumed not to depend upon which
measurement will be freely chosen and performed later. A denial of this no-
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tion would seem to contradict Bohr’s assertion, in his reply [16] to Einstein,
Rosen, and Podolsky, that “there is no question of a mechanical disturbance
of the system under investigation”. For that debate centered on the possible
dependence of properties of a system under investigation upon which experi-
ment is chosen and performed, say later, on some other system. Yet any such
nondependence of an earlier outcome on the later choice of which experiment
is performed faraway would entail the theoretical existence of what ‘would
have happened’ earlier if the later choice had been different from what it
actually turns out to be.
A logical framework for dealing in a rigorous way with this simplest puta-
tive locality condition, without violating any quantum precept, was described
in section 2. The conclusions drawn that from that framework, alone, appear
to be compatible with the predictions of quantum theory: I have found no
way to deduce any contradiction from that framework alone. This means
that the locality idea that no outcome can depend upon the far-away choice
apparently can be added to quantum theory without contradiction. This
would validate the apparent intent of Bohr’s remark about no mechanical
disturbance [See D. Mermin [17].]
This first theoretical constraint leads only to line 5 of the above proof.
To go further let us consider that statement, line 5, in a Lorentz frame in
which region L is later than region R. Line 5 then asserts, given assumption
LOC1 and truth of the statement that L2 is performed at the later time, the
truth of the following statement: If under the condition that R2 is actually
performed in the earlier region R and that nature picks the outcome R2+,
then if, instead, R1 had been freely chosen performed in region R, nature
would have picked the outcome R1−.
This places a rigid constraint on nature’s operation earlier in region R,
under the condition that L2 is performed later. Yet if that constraint were
to dissolve if L1 were to be chosen and performed later then there would be
some sort of influence of the later choice upon nature’s earlier operations in
R.
Of course, the assumption that L2 is performed in region L, is crucial to
the proof, under condition LOC1, of the existence of the constraint in region
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R: one cannot deduce the nondependence of this constraint in R on what is
freely chosen in region L merely from the premises that entailed the existence
of this constraint. The assertion that there is no back action of this kind of
the choice made in L is thus an independent assumption. I call it LOC2.
5. Consistent Histories
The basic question pertaining to the use of counterfactual reasoning to
deduce a conflict between nonlocality and the predictions of quantum theory
is whether the counterfactual reasoning used in those proofs is itself compat-
ible with the precepts of quantum theory.
One can, of course, just assert that any counterfactual reasoning that
leads to a conflict with locality is incompatible with quantum philosophy.
But that fails to address the issue. The problem is that quantum theory is
manifestly nonlocal at the computational level: when one obtains informa-
tion in one region about an entangled system, one is instructed to apply a
projection operator that automatically reduces the state also far away. This
itself is no immediate problem, because an analogous collapse is imposed
for correlated systems in classical statistical mechanics, where there is no
question of any real nonlocal effect: the faraway change is understood to
be simply a change in “our knowledge” of the faraway system. But there
is a potential nonlocality problem in the quantum case because in quantum
theory the system itself is completely represented by the wave function that
is supposed to represent “our knowledge”. This makes the faraway jump
understandable, but only at the expense of allowing the complete represen-
tation of physical reality to violate locality. Hence it is not absolutely clear, a
priori, that quantum theory necessarily is fully compatible with the putative
locality condition that actions made in one place cannot influence faraway
events.
If one is to allow any sort of counterfactual reasoning at all, even in the
classical limit that emerges from quantum theory in the limit where Planck’s
constant is set to zero, one needs spell out what the general conditions are
for valid counterfactual reasoning in a quantum context.
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Robert Griffiths [18] has devised a set of conditions that ensure that the
laws of classical logic can be applied consistently within a quantum context.
Recently [12] he has proposed a certain extension of that consistent histories
framework. This extention is designed to allow the incorporation into quan-
tum theory of certain counterfactual assertions that seem reasonable within
the structure defined by the quantum precepts. The extended framework
is explicitly quantum mechanical, and is guarenteed to produce no logical
inconsistences.
It is natural to inquire whether the nonlocality argument given above
goes through within Griffiths’ framework for incorporating counterfactual
reasoning consistently into quantum theory.
Griffiths himself [12] applied his framework to a Hardy-type situation,
and found no indication of any problem with locality. But he noted that
his framework was explicitly nonrelativistic, whereas my proof, for example,
depended on an explicitly assumed Lorentz invariance of the predictions of
the theory: this assumption is used to justify LOC2.
Actually, a direct application of Griffiths’ framework to my proof is pos-
sible. The first phase of the Hardy-type argument that Griffiths examined
is analogous to the first five lines of my proof. Griffiths examined this part
of the argument from one particular viewpoint, and found that he could get
nowhere at all. But he noted that other approaches are possible within his
general framework.
Examination of the first part of my proof, using the “no-backward-in-
time” formulation appropriate for his nonrelativistic formulation, rather than
the relativistic no-faster-than-light formulation, reveals that one should use
a frame in which the region L is earlier in time than region R. [That is
precisely the way that I formulated in ref. [10] the condition under which
this first main conclusion was derived.] The natural set of projectors to use,
to define the set of consistent histories, are those that correspond to the set
of alternative possible experimental arrangements, ordered in the way they
are ordered in nature. I shall use that natural set.
The set of consistent histories is then uniquely defined. It begins with
[Hardy, {L1, L2}, {L1&L1+, L1&L1−, L2&L2+, L2&L2−}], (5.1)
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where the symbols L1, L1+, etc. now stand for the projection operators
corresponding to the ‘Yes’ answers to the corresponding statements. Then,
at a later time, there is the set of 8 projectors
{L1&L1+ &R1, L1&L1+ &R2, L1&L1−&R1, L1&L1−&R2,
L2&L2+ &R1, L2&L2+ &R2, L2&L2−&R1, L2&L2−&R2}. (5.2)
Then, at a still later time, there is the set of 16 projectors
{L1&L1+ &R1&R1+, ...., L2&L2−&R2&R2−}. (5.3)
Line 5 of my above proof then follows directly from Griffiths’ rules’: if
one starts in sector L2, and at R2 ∧ R2+ and traces a path back (i.e., back
in time) to the place just before the choice between R2 and R1, and then
traces this path forward from that decision point along the R1 branch one
finds that one must end up in R1 ∧ R1−. The reason is that the Hardy
condition that there be no state L2 − ∧R2+ forces the L2 ∧ R2+ starting
point to be L2 + ∧R2+. But the R1/R2 decision (“Pivot”) point — on this
path that starts at L2 + ∧R2+, and moves back in time to just before the
R1/R2 decision — is reached without passing through any L decision points:
they all lie earlier. This means that when the path moves forward within the
R1 sector it is still in the L2+ sector. But then the Hardy condition that
there is no state L2 +∧R2+ forces the returning path to end up in R1−, as
specified in line 5. The conclusion, line 5, thus follows directly from Griffiths’
rules.
The key question is whether one can now impose LOC2, specified by
line 6 of the proof, without generating a contradiction with the other two
predictions of quantum theory, (3.3) and (3.4).
Lines 6, and 7 of the proof both claim, in terms of Griffiths’ formalism,
that if one starts at L1 ∧ R2 ∧ R2+ and then traces back to the R1/R2
pivot point, and then moves forward along the R1 branch, the one will end
up in R1−, not R1+. Line 8 entails that if the starting condition had been
L1 ∧R2 ∧ L1− then, because there is (in the Hardy state) no possible state
L1 ∧ R2 ∧  L1 − ∧R2−, one must be starting also from L1 ∧ R2 ∧ R2+, as
17
specified in lines 6 and 7. Thus one obtains line 9 of the proof, in the form
(L1 ∧ R2 ∧ L1−)⇒ (R1✷→ (R1 ∧R1−)). (5.4)
This asserts that starting from L1 ∧ R2 ∧ L1− and tracing back to the
R1/R2 pivot point, and then forward along the R1 branch takes one to
R1 ∧ R1−. But according to the prediction of quantum theory (3.4) the
probability for R1− is not 100%: the other possible outcome R1+ has a
nonzero probablity to appear. Thus LOC2 leads to a contradiction also
within Griffiths’ framework for consistent counterfactual reasoning within
quantum theory.
Griffiths’ claim is borne out: if one just stays within his formalism no
contradiction arises. For LOC2 does not arise within his formalism, although
the consequence of LOC1, line 5, does come out of his formalism. But one
can say more: LOC2, if assumed, leads to a contradiction. Thus the two
methods of counterfactual reasoning within quantum theory both lead to the
conclusion that an outcome that in some frame lies earlier than a later free
choice can consistently be taken to be independent of that later choice, and
that this entails line 5. But then assuming the Lorentz invariance of this
first result, going to a frame in which the time ordering of the two spacelike
separated regions is reversed, and demanding there the absence of backward-
in-time effects, entails that line 5 should hold also with L1 in place of L2. But
that condition leads, both in my approach and by using Griffiths’ prodedure,
to a contradiction with two other predictions entailed by the Hardy state.
6. Conclusions
It is possible to introduce into quantum theory, without generating any
apparent contradictions, the notion that what has already been measured and
recorded at times prior to a time T, as measured in any given rest frame,
does not depend upon which experiments are performed later. This notion
of the causal evolution of physical systems brings counterfactual reasoning
into quantum theory in a way that is, I believe, completely compatible with
the basic quantum principles: quantum physicists do not normally maintain
that the outcomes they observe today could depend upon what other exper-
imenters will decide to do tomorrow. Certainly Bohr never mentioned that
idea in order to evade the challenges of Einstein.
However, the acceptance of this weak locality property has a price!
The simplest way to state the situation is to note that what has been
proved is that the statement (R2+ implies that if, instead, R1 then R1-)
is true if L2 is performed at the later time but is false if L1 is performed
at the later time. If we combine this with the orthodox idea that “nature
chooses” a particular outcome in region R at the time of the occurrence (or
observation) of the outcome in R of which ever measurement is performed
there, then nature’s choice in the not actually realized case R1 would be
logically forced always to be R1- in the case L2 is chosen later but sometimes
be R2+ in case L1 is chosen later. The conditions that logically entail this are
that the predictions of the theory should hold whichever conditions are set
up, and that what nature chooses in R does not depend on which experiment
is chosen in L.
These conditions are different from the hidden-variable conditions, which
entail immediately, quite independently of spacetime locations, that in any
given instance the outcomes of all four possible experiments are simultane-
ously definable [8.9]. That hidden-variable assumption is manifestly at odds
with quantum philosophy, whereas our conditions are formulated within the
general framework of orthodox quantum thinking.
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APPENDIX: Set-theoretic proofs of key equations.
For any statement S expressed in terms of the rudimentary logical con-
nections let {W : S} be the set of all (physically possible) worldsW such that
statement S is true at W (i.e., S is true in world W). Sometimes {W : S}
will be shortened to {S}.
The main set-theoretic equation is this: Suppose A and B are two state-
ments expressed in terms of the rudimentary logical connections. Then
A⇒ B is true if and only if the intersection of {A} and {¬B} is void:
[A⇒ B] ≡ [{A} ∩ {¬B} = ∅]. (A.1)
Equivalently, {A} is a subset of {B}:
[A⇒ B] ≡ [{A} ⊂ {B}]. (A.2)
Let (S)W mean that the statement S is true at W . Then
(A→ B)W ≡ [(¬A)W or (B)W ]. (A.3)
Equivalently,
{A→ B} ≡ [{¬A} ∪ {B}]. (A.4)
Proof of (2.1)
Equation (2.1) reads:
[A⇒ (B → C)] ≡ [(A ∩ B)⇒ C]. (A.5)
This is equivalent to
[{A} ∩ {¬(B → C)} = ∅] ≡ [{A ∩ B} ∩ {¬C} = ∅]. (A.6)
But {¬(B → C)} is the complement of {B → C}. Using (A.4), and the fact
that the complement of {¬B} ∪ {C} is {B} ∩ {¬C}, one obtains the needed
result.
Set-theoretic forms of C✷→ D.
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According to the definition at (2.5),
(C✷→ D)W ≡
[(D)V for every V such that (C)V and (V = W outside V
+(C/W ))].
(A.7)
Equivalently,
{W : C✷→ D} ≡
{W : {{V : V = W outside V +(C/W )} ∩ {V : C}} ⊂ {V : D}}. (A.8)
Proof of (LOC1c).
LOC1c reads
(L2 ∧ R2 ∧ L2+)⇒ [R1✷→ (L2 ∧R1 ∧ L2+)]. (A.9)
To prove (A.9) it is sufficient, by virtue of (A.2) and (A.8), to show that
{{W : L2} ∩ {W : R2} ∩ {W : L2+}} ⊂
{W : {{V : V = W outside V +(R1/W )} ∩ {V : R1}}
⊂ {{V : L2} ∩ {V : R1} ∩ {V : L2+}}}. (A.10)
Let W be any world satisfying the conditions on the LHS of (A.10). Then
V +(R1/W ) is V +(R), the forward light cone from the region R. But for any
W in {W : L2} ∩ {W : L2+} the set {V : V = W outside V +(R)} ⊂ {{V :
L2} ∩ {V : L2+}}. This entails the truth of (A.10).
Proof of (LOC1d).
LOC1d asserts that if condition B is localized in a region that lies out-
side V +(C), the forward light cone from the region in which condition C is
localized, then
[(A ∧ B)⇒ (C✷→ D] ≡ [A⇒ (C✷→ (B → D))]. (A.11)
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Equation (A.11) is, by virtue of (A.2) and (A.4), equivalent to the assertion
that (A.12) and (A.13) are equivalent:
{{W : A} ∩ {W : B}} ⊂
{W : {{V : V = W outside V +(C/W )} ∩ {V : C}} ⊂ {V : D}} (A.12)
and
{W : A} ⊂
{W : {{V : V = W outside V +(C/W )} ∩ {V : C}} ⊂ {V : D} ∪ {V : ¬B}}.
(A.13)
Because condition B is localized outside of V +(C) it is localized also outside
of V +(C/W ) for all W. But then (A.12) and (A.13) are both equivalent to
{{W : A} ∩ {W : B}} ⊂
{W : {{V : V = W outside V +(C/W )}∩{V : C}} ⊂ {{V : D}∪{V : ¬B}}}.
(A.14)
Equation (A.12) is equivalent to (A.14) because the condition B imposed
on W=V in both equations renders the condition ∪{V : ¬B} inoperative.
Equation (A.13) is equivalent to (A.14) because the condition ∪{V : ¬B}
imposed on V=W in both of these equations renders the condition B on
W immaterial: relaxing in (A.14) the condition B on the W=V enlarges
throughout the equation the set of W=V by the set at which B is false.
Proof of LOC1e
The LHS of LOC1e is, by virtue of (A.2) and (A.8), equivalent to
{{W : A} ∩ {W : B}} ⊂
{W : {{V : V = W outside V +(C/W )}∩{V : C}} ⊂ {{V : D}∩{V : B}}}.
(A.15)
The condition on B entails, as before, that condition B is localized outside
V +(C/W ) for all W. Hence the condition B on W entails also the condition
B on V. Hence the final condition ∩{B} is automatic: it is entailed by the
condition B onW, and adds no extra condition. This is precisely what LOC1e
asserts.
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Proof of LOC1f
LOC1f asserts that, under the same condition that B lies outside V +(C),
[B ⇒ (C → D)]⇒ [B ⇒ (C✷→ D)]. (A.16)
By virtue of (A.2) and (A.4) the LHS is equivalent to
{W : B} ⊂ {{W : D} ∪ {W : ¬C}}. (A.17)
By virtue of (A.2) and (A.8) the RHS is equivalent to
{W : B} ⊂
{W : {{V : V = W outside V +(C/W )} ∩ {V : C}} ⊂ {V : D}}. (A.18)
As before, condition B is localized outside V +(C/W ), and hence V=W satis-
fies B. Thus, (A.17) entails that V lies in {V : D}∪{V : ¬C}. But then if V
lies also in {V : C}, as specified in (A.18), then V lies in {D}, as demanded
by (A.18). Thus the condition (A.17) entail the condition (A.18), and hence,
by virtue of (A.2), equation (A.16) holds.
Proof of Line 12
Line 12 of the proof is, by virtue of (2.1), equivalent to
(L1 ∧ R1)⇒ ¬(L1− → R1 ∧R1−). (A.19)
By virtue of (A.1) and (A.4) this is equivalent to
{L1} ∩ {R1} ∩ {{R1−} ∪ {¬L1−}} = ∅.
This implies, by virtue of (3.5),
{L1} ∩ {R1} ∩ {{¬R1−} ∩ {L1−}} 6= ∅. (A.20)
But equation (3.4) is, by virtue of (A.1), equivalent to
{L1} ∩ {R1} ∩ {L1−} ∩ {¬R1−} 6= ∅. (A.21)
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Proof of the incompatibility of lines 11 and 14 of the proof.
According to (A.2) and (A.8), line 11 is equivalent to
{{W : L1} ∩ {W : R2}} ⊂
{W : {{V : V = W outside V +(R1/W )} ∩ {V : R1}}
∩{¬R1−} ∩ {L1−} = ∅}. (A.22)
On the other hand, line 14 asserts that
{{W : L1} ∩ {W : R2}} ⊂
{W : {{V : V = W outside V +(R1/W )} ∩ {V : R1}}
∩{{R1−}} ∪ {¬L1−}}} = ∅}. (A.23)
Condition (A.22) entails that if W=V lies in {L1∧L1−} and V lies in {R1}
then V cannot lie in {¬R1−}. But equation (A.23) entails that if W=V lies
in {L1 ∧L1−} and V lies {R1} then V cannot lie in {R1−}. But, by virtue
on (3.5), there are W such that W lies in {L1 ∧ L1−}; and any V in {R1}
must lie in either {R1−} or {¬R1−}. Thus lines 11 and 14 are incompatible.
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